Bitcoin security is based on SHA256 and the discrete log assumption:

• GPG keys are used to sign hashes of Bitcoin Core or commits.
• There was an alert key.
• Some offchain protocols use OMDL (a stronger assumption).

Correctness proofs:

• Correct, but there are losses in proofs.
• You shouldn't use Schnorr on secp256k1 if you only trust the ROM.
• If a system only has a proof:
  • There's an alternative model.
    • 0 testing assumption: Assume your hash function receives a polynomial and doesn’t output a root of the polynomial.

In silent payments:

• They use ECDH but don’t hash the result; this should have a proof.

Cultural notes:

• There’s a lot of culture: a wrong proof might be accepted if the loss doesn’t "count."
• The secp256k1 curve is pretty straightforward.

Multiparty ECDSA:

• Dismissed in Bitcoin space due to the Paillier cryptoassumption (related to RSA).

Crypto assumptions:

• Some assumptions are stable (e.g., discrete log), but RSA and pairing curves have weakened.
• Quantum computers (QC) break the discrete log.
  • Collisions in QC are not better than classical computers.
  • (Second-) preimage in QC requires square root work using Grover’s algorithm.

Post-quantum cryptography (PQ):

• Two categories:
  1. Based on hashes.
  2. Others:
     • Lattices.
     • Isogenies (recently broken).
     • Codes (stable since the 1960s but require megabytes of data).
• Is QC even a problem?
  • Opinion: It will completely destroy Bitcoin, so it’s not worth worrying about.
  • We should present a technical solution to signatures at least.

QROM and Bitcoin Mining

• ROM works well with quantum computers, but instantiation with a hash function isn’t satisfactory anymore.
• In QROM, you can query a hash function on a superposition of states.
• Can prove knowledge of BIP39 keys if QC becomes relevant.

Post-Quantum Solutions

• Best to have a scheme ready now.
• Hash-based signatures should be easy to implement.
• Bandwidth isn’t currently a problem (not the bottleneck for IBD).

NIST standards:

• FAEST: 5kB signatures.
• SPHINCS.
• There’s a BIP for post-quantum signatures.

Idea:

• Put a Lamport public key in the taproot tree + reserve an OP code for it.
  • Soft-fork out key path spend.
  • But then what?

Concerns:

• Transition to PQ could be very fast.
• We should not trust the government to help with the PQ transition.
• Currently, no good PQ signature scheme exists.
• NIST is continuing to standardize PQ signatures.

Using SNARK:

• Can aggregate all signatures in a block.
• A 40MB PQ block might take as long to verify as a 4MB block today.

Other notes:

• Bandwidth is increasing worldwide (including in sub-Saharan Africa).
• There’s a recent post-quantum BIP, but details are scarce.
• The timewarp attack still exists.
• QC attacks on signatures wouldn’t necessarily break Bitcoin’s social contract.

Outcomes

• Shared understanding of what could and should be done.
  • Commit to a public key in the taproot tree and an opcode:

    <Schnorr pk> <CHECKSIGVERIFY> <Lamport public key> <OP_NOP42>
    

    • This doesn’t work because there are no NOPs in Tapscript for redefining—just a real NOP.

Lamport signatures:

• With Lamport sigs, you could potentially implement covenants (humorously noted as "lol").